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SOLAR ACCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS:
REPLY TO A "MAVERICK" ANALYSIS
by Dale D. Goble*
In a recent article published in this journal, 1 Professor Stephen
Williams argued that the existing literature on solar energy presents a
"skewed vision" of the legal obstacles to providing solar energy sys
tems with access to direct sunlight. This is the result, he concludes,
of viewing the problem solely as an energy issue--a view that "read
ily leads to neglect of the real costs entailed by the legal changes . .
proposed to smooth the path of solar energy."2 To correct this per
ceived imbalance, Williams advances an alternative approach: the ap
plication of a property rights analysis drawn from welfare economics
theory. He poses the issue in terms of the efficiency of existing prop
erty concepts as they relate to the problem of solar access, and he ex
amines whether these concepts are "as effective as they might be in
bringing about the maximization of the value of all the resources at
stake when solar access is in conflict with other land uses. "3
The market basis of this approach has a strong emotional appeal.
In its reliance on the market, Williams' method initially appears to
avoid overt coercion, thus obviating the conflicts that frequently arise
with the use of more obviously political forms of decisionmaking. The
conflicts, however, are not eliminated, but only obscured: a decision
to rely upon the market is itself inherently political. 4
This does not mean that the decision cannot be justified or that
the market may not be the best solution. Williams, however, does
not offer such a justification. Instead, he presents his arguments as
objective reality: gravity makes apples fall and the market-if left to its
own devices-will lead us all to an economic Garden of Eden. But
* A.B., Columbia College (1970); J.D., University of Oregon (1978). I would like to
thank C. Edwin Baker and Carol C. Bradford for their thoughtful review of an earlier
draft of this article.
1. Williams, Solar Access and Property Rights: A Maverick Analysis, 11 CONN. L.
REv. 430 (1979).
2. Id. at 431.
3. Id.
4. See generally Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSO
PHY & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975).
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neither welfare economics nor its property rights progeny is physics.
Their propositions are not scientifically verifiable;5 they are hypothetical ethical judgments. The distinction is crucial: physics is descriptive and predictive; welfare economics is prescriptive and normative.
Thus, while it is possible to test a proposition from the realm of physics, a proposition from welfare economics can be "tested" only by
examining its assumptions. Welfare economics is a branch of theology.r
There is nothing inherently wrong with this. However, by consistently ignoring these basic assumptions and normative judgments,
Williams' prescriptive statements assume an air of unwarranted objectivity. The result is an analysis that is at least as skewed as, and far
less self-conscious than, the one he criticizes. 7 This reply is offered as
an antidote to Williams' apparent objectivity-as a buyer's guide, in
the phrase of one economist, to economic analysis as a potentially defective product.8 Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to examine the assumptions and normative judgments inherent in Williams'
analysis.
This reply is in three sections. Sections I and II examine two
groups of assumptions-"perfection assumptions" and "neutrality assumptions." The final section applies the results of the first two sections to Williams' conclusions on the advisability of adopting alternative property right structures.
I.

PERFECTION ASSUMPTIONS

Williams' central thesis is that "the market value of any solar access rights that a parcel might enjoy will incorporate any advantages
5. Nagel, Assumptions in Economic Theory, 53 AM. ECON. RE%,. (Papers & Proc.) 211
(1963).
6. As the most active welfare economics theorist noted: "Efficiency statements [are]
... to be understood as normative statements, and welfare propositions ... rest ultimately on an ethical basis." Mishan, The Futility of Pareto-Efficient Distributions, 62
As. ECON. REv. 971, 972 (1972). Mishan has also commented that "so remote is the
likelihood of testing welfare implications that one is tempted to relinquish the orthodox
methodology and have recourse to an admittedly inferior method ... of attempting to
ascertain the validity of the premises." E. MISHAN,A Survey of Welfare Economics, in
WELFARE ECONOmcCs 11, 15-16 (2d ed. 1969).

7. "So long as a proposition of welfare economics is phrased in the form: 'If you accept certain judgments (and certain, often unbelievable, factual assumptions), then you
should do this,' it is unobjectionable. But it is not usable unless we accept both the
judgments and the assumptions." Junger, A Recipe for Bad Water. Welfare Economics
and Nuisance Law Mixed Well, 27 CAsE W.L. REv. 3, 29 (1976).
8. See Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's
Guide to PosneFs Economic Analysis of Law, 87 lARV. L. REv. 1655 (1974).
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that solar energy has in relation to other energy resources." 9 This belief is supported explicitly by the argument that in calculating the
value of access rights, individuals will determine all of the costs associated with other energy resources, e.g., their price, availability, and

likelihood of disruption. These costs will be reflected in the value of a
parcel with access. Thus, to maximize the value of all the resources
present, it is necessary only to "maximize the value of the land affected by the conflict in uses."' 0
The central role of prices in this argument should be apparent:
they are the medium that allows the parties to determine the relative
values involved. It is at this point that Williams' thesis relies upon a

number of implicit and often questionable assumptions concerning
the conditions necessary for a perfect market. Only such a perfect
market will generate "correct" prices. Thus, in the absence of a per-

fect market, the individual who is faced with inconsistent land uses
may make a decision based on faulty information."'

Although Williams does note qualifications to his thesis,' 2 the
difficulties inherent in his market-based approach are both more gen-

eral and more pervasive than his article suggests. These difficulties
are illuminated by a brief examination of the conditions required for a
perfect market.
In constructing market theory, economists have adopted a num9. Williams, supra note 1, at 432.
10. Id. at 431.
11. To take an obvious example, the present price controls on domestic oil subsidize
its consumption. If a barrel of oil sells on the world market for $23, but domestic oil can
be sold for only $9, the solar energy sufficient to replace a barrel of oil is undervalued
by at least $14. Arguably the undervaluation is far greater because the value that should
be considered is the replacement value rather than the market value. The replacement
cost-the cost of a barrel of synthetic oil, for example-is much greater than the current
market price. Even at market prices, however, the subsidization is staggering: almost
$15 billion per year. See Stobaugh, After the Peak: The Threat of Imported Oil, in ENERGY FuTuRE 16, 46 (1979).
In addition to such indirect subsidies, there have been massive direct subsidies to
both fossil and nuclear fuels. These have totaled more than $120 billion. See Stobaugh
& Yergin, The End of Easy Oil, in ENERGY FuTuRE 3, 11 (1979). Such direct subsidies
are reflected in taxes rather than energy bills and thus do not provide the market signals
that price and market theories require.
12. In addition to price controls, Williams notes three other "concerns" with fossil
and nuclear fuels that "might qualify" his thesis: the presence of environmental externalities, concern for the welfare of future generations, and national security problems
resulting from our increasing dependence on imported energy. Williams, supra note 1,
at 432-36.
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ber of simplifying assumptions, 1 3 only three of which will be exam-

ined here: perfect knowledge, no externalities, and no transaction
costs.

A. Imperfect Knowledge
The most striking false assumption is that of perfect knowledge.
Every economic agent is assumed to have complete, accurate, and
costless knowledge of all relevant factors for all times. In determining
the value of solar access, for example, an individual must know not
only the present price of all other energy resources, but also their
prices at all points in the future. 1 4 Since humans are not omniscient,
this assumption is false.
The uneven distribution of information among individuals often
presents more significant problems than does a uniform lack of knowledge.' 5 Solar energy, for example, faces substantial impediments be-

cause of its novelty. While most people have at least a general familiarity with the economics of conventional fuels-if only through the

size of their utility bills-few have a corresponding knowledge of solar energy. 16
B.

Externalities

An "externality" is any beneficial or harmful effect on another
person resulting from an action where an actor does not include the
effect in the cost calculations of the action.' 7 For example, A ovns a
13. See generally J. DE V. GRAAFF, THEORETICAL WELFARE EcoNo uCs 142-54
(1957); S. NATH, A REAPPRAISAL OF WELFARE ECONOMuCS 28 (1969).

14. Because of the importance of the Mideast to such calculations, the individual
also must know the future course of political developments in an area which has
witnessed "a half-dozen wars, a dozen revolutions, and innumerable assassination (sic]
and territorial disputes" in the last thirty years and one which is undergoing the most
rapid cultural transition in history. Stobaugh & Yergin, supra note 11, at 5.
15. "[T]he critical impact of information on the optimal allocation ...is not merely
its presence or absence but its inequality among economic agents." Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus
Nonmarket Allocation, in 1 JOINT ECON. CO.M., 91ST CONG., IST SESS., THE ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTF-i 47, 55 (Comm. Print

1969).
16. For example, the fact that it is now generally less expensive to heat water for domestic purposes with the sun rather than with electricity is not widely known. See I
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, APPLICATION OF
SOLAR ENERGY TO TODAY'S ENERGY NEEDS 3-4 (1978). One result is that fewer solar
water heaters are installed than the relative costs would justifv.
17. See P. SAIMUELSON, ECONOMICS 476-85 (10th ed. 1976).
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coal-fired boiler that is used to generate electricity. B, A's neighbor,
operates a laundry. B hangs the clothes outside to dry where they are
frequently soiled by soot from A's plant. The soot is external to A's
cost calculations; it simply blows away. As a result, the soot's
cost-the value of the resources that must be used to remedy the
problem, e.g., the cost of rewashing the clothes, purchasing dryers,
or installing a pollution-control device-is not included in the price
that A charges for electricity. Instead, A has passed this cost to B.
The economic effect of externalities is an inefficient allocation of
resources since in a perfect market there would be no externalities.
A, for instance, would "internalize" all externalities. However, since
A is able to pass some of the costs of producing electricity to B, the
price of electricity does not include its full production costs; the market is imperfect. As a result, too much electricity-and too much
pollution-is produced in comparison to products that generate no
externalities. 18

Williams' response to these problems is sophistical. While
acknowledging that there are residual environmental effects and risks
in using fossil and nuclear fuels, he nevertheless concludes that the
"mere fact of residual environmental damage does not prove that energy products fail to reflect environmental costs."19 Unfortunately,

this conclusion begs several fundamental issues.
The question is not whether energy products reflect environmental costs, but whether they reflect all costs. If they do not, the market
18. See generally Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 356-63
(1968); Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1971); Randall, Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context,
14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (1974).

19. Williams, supra note 1, at 433-34. Williams supports his conclusion casuistically
by assuming that the cost of implementing existing environmental regulations Is greater
than the value of their benefits:
[I]f production and distribution of 100 kilowatt hours of electricity impose 250
of uncorrected environmental damage, but the producer has incurred costs of
$1.00 in eradicating 75¢ worth of damage, it seems that on a net basis the activity has involved no environmental costs not reflected in the price.
Id. at 434. Williams does not, however, present any evidence to support his apparently
empirical hypothesis. Rather, he attacks the Environmental Protection Agency for
refusing to "conduct meaningful cost-benefit studies of its regulations." Id. at 434 n.13.
Williams' touching belief in the possibility and utility of "meaningful cost-benefit studies" is a corollary of his faith in welfare economics. Unfortunately, however, "no widely
accepted method of assessing benefits exists." Starr, Rudman & Whipple, Philosophical
Basis for Risk Analysis, 1 ANN. REV. ENERGY 629, 638 (1976). See generally Coble,
Increasing the Use of the Sun: A Potential Role for the Energy Utilities, 14 TULSA L.J.
63, 67-71 (1978).
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allocation will be less than optimal. It is possible that a nonmarket solution such as pollution-control legislation will produce a more efficient and socially desirable outcome. Thus, in the presence of uncorrected externalities, there is no a priori reason for preferring a
market allocation to a nonmarket one.
In addition, Williams fails to take into account nonenvironmental
externalities, such as the social unrest generated by antinuclear activities. This type of externality imposes costs that are not reflected in
20
the price of nuclear-generated electricity.
Thus, the externalities issues are far more complex and pervasive
than Williams' brief discussion indicates. Their impact on his central
thesis is also more significant than his argument acknowledges: the
presence of externalities indicates that the market allocation is not efficient.21
C. Transaction Costs

A reader familiar with recent literature on property rights might
object at this point that these criticisms must be rejected or at least
modified by the Coase Theorem. 22 Professor Coase has claimed that
under specified assumptions the initial assignment of entitlements
(i.e., property rights and liability rules) does not affect the market's
allocation of resources. Regardless of the initial assignment, resources
will be shifted to their most valuable use. Thus, a frictionless market
will produce an efficient allocation.
To return to the dirty laundry hypothetical, assume that there
are two possible solutions: a pollution-control device costing $90 and
clothes dryers costing $100. According to the Theorem, regardless of
the initial entitlement (i.e., whether A holds a right to pollute or B is
20. Not even all of the quantifiable costs are reflected in utility bills. The costs of
policing, arresting, jailing, feeding, and prosecuting demonstrators, for example, do not
fal on those constructing or operating nuclear plants, but on local taxpayers. Wqile such

costs can be quantified, any attempt to place a monetary value on the political polarization and loss of social consensus would be highly speculative.
Nuclear energy may also impose other, even more significant nonenvironmental externalities. For example, there is an increasing body of analysis that plausibly argues that
the security requirements of a nuclear society are incompatible with political democracy. Compare Weinberg, Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy, 177 Sci. 27, 33-34
(1972), with Comment, Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout, 10 HAIl'.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 369 (1975).
21. See Mishan, The Economics of Disamenity, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55, 57 (1974).
22. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Although Williams
does not explicitly employ the Theorem in his analysis, he does recognize that it is
merely an alternative formulation of his approach. Williams, supra note 1, at 431 n.3.
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entitled to be free from pollution) a perfect market will produce an
efficient allocation of the resources involved. B will pay A between
$90 and $100 to install the device if B is not entitled to be free from
pollution. If A is not entitled to pollute, on the other hand, A will install the device because B will be unwilling to sell the entitlement for
less than $100. Thus, ignoring the distributional effects-which according to Coase do not affect production-the externality will be
corrected, and the market's allocation will be efficient without governmental intervention.
The assumptions underlying the Theorem, however, render it
"invalid or irrelevant in all practical cases." 2 3 The most important assumption is that transactions are costless. 2 4 Transaction costs2 5 may
be minimal in some real markets, but they are never zero-if only
because of the time required for the parties to reach an agreement. 20
The impact of transaction costs can be readily demonstrated. If
A, the plant operator, is not liable for the effects of the soot and the
transaction costs exceed $10, no agreement will be reached. The cost
of the pollution-control device ($90) plus the transaction costs is
greater than the cost of the dryers ($100). The result is an inefficient
allocation.
A more significant problem is the frequent asymmetry of transaction costs. For example, if B is a group of homeowners rather than a
laundry owner, there will be additional costs incurred because of the
need for negotiation among the members of the group. 27 Moreover,
23. Randall, Welfare, Efficiency, and the Distribution of Rights, in PERSPECTIVES
or PROPERTY 25, 27 (1972).

24. See Coase, supra note 22, at 8. This raises an obvious but often neglected point:
The Theorem is theoretically neutral vis-a-vis the initial assignment of entitlements.
Since the market will allocate the resources efficiently regardless of the initial assignment, it should be of little importance to unreconstructed Coasians whether the
entitlement is to obstruct or receive sunlight. Posner and other Coasians have sought to
circumvent this by positing that the "right should be assigned to the party whose use Is
the more valuable." R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS

OF LAW 18 (1972) (emphasis

added). On the circularity of this approach, see notes 53-55 infra and accompanying
text.
25. "Transaction costs" are the costs of reaching an agreement. They include the
cost of information, of actual negotiations, and of memorializing and enforcing any
agreement.
26. See generally Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968). Thus, remedying information or externality problems involves transaction costs. In one sense, the Theorem merely transforms
information and externality problems into transaction costs problems, and then assumes
them away.
27. As Arrow has stressed: "It is not the presence of bargaining costs per se but
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some members of B may refuse to participate, hoping that the other
members will buy the pollution-control device and thus confer a ben-

efit on the holdouts at no cost to them. 28 The presence and
asymmetries of transaction costs help to explain "why market solu29
tions to significant externality problems are seldom observed."

In a world of frequently asymmetrical transaction costs, initial
property entitlements can have a significant effect in two ways. First,
the presence of transaction costs may effectively preclude a bargained
alteration of the initial position. Second, the initial position will often

determine the magnitude of the costs.30
Although Williams recognizes the significance of transaction
costs, he optimistically minimizes their importance. 3 ' Such optimism
is problematic, however, when one considers both the novelty of so-

lar energy32 and its kinetic nature.
In general, novelty can increase transaction costs by increasing

information expenses asymmetrically. For example, even in the most
promising situation involving new, large single-developer tracts, there
are transaction costs. While the developer can assure individual par-

cels with access through the use of subdivision restrictions, he must
their bias that is relevant." Arrow, supra note 15, at 51.
Transaction costs can be asymmetrical even in bargaining between individuals. While
information on the cost of the dryers is likely to be relatively inexpensive, information
on the pollution control will probably be much more costly because of the need of
matching the device to the particular generating system. This information would be
more accessible (and thus less costly) to A than to B. As a result, B is more likely to install dryers (an inefficient allocation).
28. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. RPEv. 1089, 1106-08 (1972); E.
MISHAN, Pareto Optimality and the Law, in WELFARE ECONOMICS 25 (2d ed. 1969).
29. Randall, supra note 23, at 27.
30. These two points have been borne out by the only available empirical study on
the relationship of transaction costs and externalities. See Crocker, Externalities,Property Rights, and Transaction Costs: An Empirical Study, 14 J.L. & EcON. 451, 464
(1971).
These conclusions should not be surprising. Indeed, most lavwyers have a general familiarity with the underlying rationale from nuisance law or from such products liability
rubrics as "enterprise liability." The basic policy conclusion was aptly stated by justice
Traynor: "[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
Translating the terminology, because a manufacturer has lower transaction costs, it is in
the position to make any necessary changes at a lower total cost.
31. Williams, supra note 1, at 437-40.
32. See generally notes 15 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
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initially decide to build a solar subdivision-a decision that probably
built homes. The
represents a major change in how he has previously
33
cost of such inertia should not be underestimated.
The second type of problem results largely from the apparent
diurnal and annual motion of the sun which produces a constantly
shifting pattern of shadows. 34 Williams appears to have ignored this
problem when he concluded that "in the typical established residential zone, someone seeking reasonable assurances of solar access will
[generally] have to deal only with one neighbor to the south. " 3
While generalizations are difficult because of the wide variety of
housing, vegetation, and street orientation patterns, in traditional
rectangular-grid developments objects on five adjoining lots may
shade portions of the solar owner's parcel during the day. A high-rise
structure would shade an even larger area. The possibility of
negotiating with several neighbors increases both the magnitude of
36
the transaction costs and the potential for holdouts.
33. See generally Hirshberg & Schoen, Barriers to the Widespread Utilization of
Residential Solar Energy: The Prospectsfor Solar Energy in the U.S. Housing Industry,
5 POL'Y ScI. 453 (1974). The developer may have to educate his potential customers as
well as himself. The housing industry "is highly sensitive to initial investments (first
cost of its products) .... Solar devices which have lower operating costs but higher initial investment costs than other energy systems could ... be expected to meet Industry
resistance." Id. at 458. It may also produce consumer resistance-at least until the concepts of life-cycle costing become more familiar. Finally, unlike other types of subdivision restrictions, solar access covenants must be tailored to the idiosyncratic conditions
of the particular area. Drafting unique restrictions for each parcel will increase costs.
See Myers, Solar Access Rights in Residential Developments, 24 PRAc. LAw. 13 (1978).
34. See generally S. KRAEMER, SOLAR LAW 197-206 (1978).
35. Williams, supra note 1, at 438. Williams apparently bases this conclusion at least
partially on the existing "legal and economic limits on construction heights." Id. at 440.
Over all but the very short run, however, such limitations are largely chimerical. The
individual landowner, for example, has no rights in an existing zoning classification:
"'zoning regulations are not contracts by government and may be modified." Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 323 (1932). Cf. Cain v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
26 II1. App. 3d 574, 579-80, 325 N.E.2d 799, 804 (1975) (finding that the plaintiff had no

common law right to light, the court concluded: "Consequently, even though the 1957
Chicago Zoning Ordinance [now] permits defendants to deprive plaintiffs of air [and]
light . . . that ordinance does not change or modify any duty owed to plaintiffs," and
thus no action can be maintained). As a result, zoning ordinances are frequently
changed. See Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeinga Place in the Sun, 57 On. L. REV.
94, 123 n.116 (1977).
36. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text. See also Miller, Legal Obstacles
to Decentralized Solar Energy Technologies, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 595, 603 (1979). Even if
Williams' assumption that the solar owner will have to negotiate with only one landowner is granted, his conclusions do not necessarily follow. While the situation may indeed be a "bilateral monopoly," Williams, supra note 1, at 438, the relationship is char-
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The complexity of the sun's motion also increases transaction
costs in another way. Under current law, a landowner must purchase
easements from neighbors in order to be assured of solar access.

Since easements are interests in real property, their transfers must
satisfy feudal conveyancing requirements 3 7 which will generally re-

quire the services of at least one lawyer. While these costs may be
reduced gradually, solar easements "will remain difficult to describe

because of the relationship of the sun to the earth."38 The cost of
drawing up an agreement that must contain a mass of detailed and
technical information varying with the idiosyncratic features of the

particular parcels is likely to remain relatively high.
Thus, the obstacles to a perfect market-the lack of perfect
knowledge, the presence of externalities, and the irreducible quantum of transaction costs-demonstrate that the actual market for solar
access will depart significantly from the theoretical market. The pub-

lic has less information on solar energy and thus must expend more
resources to learn about it. Fossil and nuclear fuels create substantial
environmental and social externalities that are not reflected in their
prices. Finally, because of novelty, inertia, and multiparty negotia-

tions, transaction costs will be high. More importantly, because each
of these impediments increases the cost of solar energy, each is

biased in the same direction. Since these costs fall upon the person
seeking to secure access, many theoretically efficient transactions will
not take place. The result, in short, is a systematic bias that is
39
impeding a transition to solar energy.
acterized by grossly unequal bargaining power. The solar owner (S)has no leverage on
the neighbor (N) because S can buy from no one else. While N can sell to no one else,
N's position is not worsened by holding out for an exorbitant price. Williams understates this problem, perhaps because he identifies opportunity income with actual income. See generally Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in
the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979).
37. See, e.g., Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954).
38. S. KRAEMEa,, supra note 34, at 42. Ironically, Williams cites Kraemer to support
his conclusion that standardized forms will reduce drafting costs. Williams, supra note
1, at 438 n.22. While Kraemer offers some forms, he is far less sanguine about the utility
of easements as the method for assuring solar access: "Lawyers, engineers, land planners, title companies and others have expressed concern over the complexity required
to write a solar easement containing highly detailed, technical information ....New solutions are required for a new problem." S. KRAE.E, supra note 34, at 42 (emphasis
added).
39. Williams does recognize this problem: "The present law may be said to disfavor
solar energy in the sense that the burden of overcoming transaction costs is always on
the person seeking solar access." Williams, supra note 1, at 457. Characteristically, how-
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D. Second Best
The presence of market imperfections does not, however, adduce
a crystalline policy recommendation. This is the result of what economists call the Theory of Second Best. 40 While a strict formulation
relies heavily on rather abstruse mathematics, the Theory is the economic analogue of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: In any condition that is the result of a number of variables over which the actor
does not have complete control or knowledge, it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of changing any but not all variables. Or
again, whenever a market departs significantly from perfection, remedying only some of the defects may actually reduce total efficiency.
The Theory is a cautionary tale on economic hubris, not a prohibition against action in a world where omniscience is rare. In many
cases intervention may improve efficiency at a lower cost than would
the operation of the market. Something close to this conclusion
justifies pollution-control legislation, for example. 41 Similarly, the
Theory actually supports actions which increase imperfections in
some areas. Patents, for example, can be defended for increasing
longrun efficiency by stimulating inventions, even though they reduce shortrun efficiency by restricting economically relevant informa42
tion.
The Theory reveals another fundamental point. In this less-thanperfect world, a decision to rely upon or to intervene in an imperfect
market cannot be made solely or even primarily on market criteria.
The decision can be justified only by examining a wide range of factors, of which market concerns may be among the least important.

II.

NEUTRALiTY ASSUMPrIONS
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on the market as a factual issue: Does the model accurately reflect actual markets? The focus now shifts to the market as an ethical model: Does the model's
normative content provide an explanation for the observed bias?
ever, he immediately qualifies this statement by arguing that "[o]f course, in many
cases it will not be necessary... for the solar user to incur any transaction costs at all."
Id. at 457 n.65.
40. Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD.
11 (1957).
41. See Calabresi, supra note 26, at 69-70.

42. See also Epstein, "Theory of Second Best" in Operation: A Comment on the
1976 Modification of the Electrical Equipment Consent Decrees, 22 ANTITRUST BULL.
503 (1977).
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Welfare economists, despite the apparently prescriptive content
of "-welfare," modestly claim that their concern is with allocation (i.e.,
how resources are assigned to a particular use) and not with distribution (i.e., how things are apportioned among people). 43 This is a magical dividing line: positive (i.e., "scientific") economics to one side,
ethics and politics to the other. The supposed divide, however, is
merely a rhetorical ploy concealing a number of questionable normative assumptions and judgments. These assumptions may be correct,
but any analysis that systematically obscures or denies its normative
content is at best dissembling and at worst dishonest.
A. The Assumption That Efficiency Is DistributionallyNeutral
The normative content of welfare economics is wrapped up in
the concept of "efficiency." This concept is employed as the primary
evaluative criterion for examining different allocations. Williams uses
the term as a measure of a particular entitlement "in bringing about
the maximization of the value of all the resources at stake."" This informal definition is a corollary of the more formal one generally accepted by property rights analysts: "Efficiency is a technical term: it
means exploiting economic resources in such a way that human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for
goods and services is maximized." 45 Although the term initially ap43. For example, Posner admits that an "economist cannot tell us whether... consumer satisfaction should be the dominant value of society." R. POSNER, Supra note 24,
at 4-5 (emphasis added). This admission is the result of the assumption that it is impossible to make interpersonal comparisons without an explicit ethical standard. Another
assumption, however, is also required to reach this general conclusion: All distributional goals are based on comparisons of individual's relative welfare. Both assumptions
are open to question. See I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE EcoNo.ucs 51-57
(2d paperbound ed. 1973); Baker, Posners Privacy Mysterj and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law, 12 GA. L. REv.475 (1978).
44. Williams, supra note 1, at 431.
45. P, POSNER, supra note 24, at 4. Up to this point, this article has avoided
introducing the more arcane analytic tools and terminology of welfare economics. There
has been no explicit discussion of indifference curves, or Edgeworth boxes, for example.
However, it is now necessary to introduce briefly "Pareto optimality," the formal construct for the concept of efficiency. Pareto optimality is the supposedly nonnormative
basis for the great divide between allocation and distribution: "There is an objective
criterion for choosing a 'good' act... namely, that if, for any change in circumstances,
no one is made worse off and at least one person is made better off, then it can be
unambiguously asserted that the general welfare is improved .......
Johnson, An
Optimal State Water Law: Fixed Water Rights and Flexible Market Prices, 57 VA. L.
REV. 345, 348-49 (1971) (emphasis added). The difficulty of constructing an objective
standard that requires such ethical concepts as "better" and "worse" should be appar-
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pears to be a scientifically objective and ethically neutral standard,
closer scrutiny reveals that it is actually biased and normative.40
These limitations result from the almost tautological interweaving
of definitions that make up the concept. "Efficiency" is the maximization of value. "Value" is measured through the market by willingness
to pay.47 Willingness to pay, however, is at least partially a function
of ability to pay which, in turn, is dependent upon the existing inent. The leading theoretical welfare economist is more explicit. He lists Pareto
optimality among the three "ethical judgments" underlying welfare economics. See E.
MISHAN, A Survey of Welfare Economics, supra note 6, at 13-14. Its ethical or normative nature is the subject of this section.
It should also be apparent that Pareto optimality is an exceedingly trivial standard. By
definition it is applicable to few if any real-world situations since the vast majority of resource reallocations will produce losers and gainers. In an attempt to extend the criterion to more realistic situations, a weakened test has been suggested. Under this
standard, a change "is favorably viewed if the gains enjoyed by winners exceed the
losses experienced by the losers. Where (this] test is met, the winners would be able to
compensate the losers if transactioncosts between the parties were zero." Williams, supra note 1, at 456 n.64 (emphasis added). Four points are worth noting. First, the
standard is at least as normative as the more stringent version. Second, if compensation
is not paid-and the criterion does not require actual payment-any consensus that the
stringent test is unobjectionable disappears. At a minimum, the losers can be expected
to object. Third, if compensation is paid, there will be a new distribution of wealth, and
the allocation that initially satisfied the weak test may no longer be optimal. In fact, the
old allocation may now be optimal. The result will be a continual shifting between the
two allocations. See E. MISHAN, A Re-appraisal of the Principles of Resource Allocation, in WELFARE ECONOMICS 117, 122-25 (2d ed. 1969). Fourth, transaction costs will
never be zero and will frequently be astronomical in such reallocations. The weakened
criterion thus does not significantly advance the utility of applying an "efficiency," or
Pareto optimality, standard.
46. See Baker, supra note 4.
47. "Value" is a slippery term. The author of a standard treatise begins the section
entitled "Concepts of Value" by quoting Humpty Dumpty's famous dictum from Lewis
Carroll's Through the Looking Glass: "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, In a
rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.' " 1
J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 3 (1937). Williams does not provide a defini-

tion of "value." Because of his desire to structure the discussion in terms of land values,
he instead defines "market value": "Market value is fundamentally the discounted current value of the expected net income stream from the property" where "income" is understood to include nonpecuniary "values." Williams, supra note 1, at 432 n.4. While
this approach initially appears promising and does serve to emphasize the fact that solar
access will affect land values, it creates analytic difficulties. His discussion of the comparative values of access and intensive (obstructive) land uses, for example, is unduly
muddled by his unwillingness to compare the values directly. See id. at 443. Williams'
procedure is analogous to adding x (the value of the "raw" land) to both sides of an
equation-it is not incorrect, but it does complicate the problem without materially aiding in its solution.
Rather than belabor these difficulties further, it seems best to simply follow Posner:
"Value . . . is defined by willingness to pay." R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 4. In any

event, Williams' definition can be demonstrated to reduce to Posner's.
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come and wealth (entitlements) distribution. 48 "Efficiency" thus
serves to do little more than reify the existing distribution. That is,
property rights, as "the set of economic and social relations defining
the position of each individual with respect to the utilization of scarce
resources," 49 determine the roles and relative status of individuals in
the market and thus the "efficient" allocation of resources by the
market. 50
Three points are now apparent. First, calling a particular allocation "efficient" is not saying much. To assert that the allocation is efficient because it is the outcome that would be the result in a perfect
market, after initially assuming that a perfect market is the only form
of allocation that produces efficiency, is tautological. Nevertheless,
this is the result of the interrelated definitions built into the term. 51
Denominating an allocation "efficient" is unenlightening in another way. Since "efficiency" is a function of the initial distribution, a
change in the distribution also alters the efficient outcome. If economists are to avoid interpersonal comparisons, however, they cannot
52
compare alternative but equally efficient allocations.
Finally, since entitlements determine efficiency, Williams' goal
of using efficiency to determine entitlements 53 is a meaningless charade. As Archimedes concluded long ago, an independent leverage
point is required to move the world. But Williams does not offer an
independent point. Rather, he implicitly assumes the economic status
quo and proceeds to discover that what is, is very nearly the best:
"all transfers that occur will be beneficial ones. 54 The conclusion is
48. Even Posner recognizes that "[w]illingness to pay is ...a function of the existing distribution of income and wealth in the society." R. POSNEB, supra note 24, at 4.
49. Furubotn & Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J.ECON. LrrERATURE 1137, 1139 (1972) (footnote omitted).
50. See Baker, supra note 43. For example, C likes oranges and D likes apples. C,
however, is wealthy while D is poor. Oranges will thus have a higher "value" than apples because C is willing and able to pay more for them. Therefore, an allocation of
more resources to the production of oranges is justified as "efficient" because of their
greater value. If the relative wealth of C and D is reversed, however, the production of
more apples is efficient. As Warren Samuels bluntly stated: "Rights specify efficiency,
efficiency does not specify rights." Samuels, The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law
and Economics, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 9 (1974).

51. Here, as elsewhere, welfare economists frequently disregard their apparently rigorous definitions and use terms in their popular sense. It is difficult, for example, to
question the value of "competence" or "effectiveness"-two synonyms for "efficient." It
is, however, much easier to question a standard based on ability to pay.
52. See E. MISHAN, A Re-appraisal of the Principles of Resource Allocation, supra
note 45, at 133-34. See also Randall, supra note 23, at 28.
53. See Williams, supra note 1, at 431.
54. Id. at 437.
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merely the elaboration of his initial adoption of the existing distribution. In some situations this would present no major problems. However, when the key issue is what the distribution of entitlements
should be, "an analysis that must assume an existing distribution can55
not provide guidance."
The ease and apparently nonprescriptive air of his conclusion reveal the ideological bias implicit in Williams' argument. As two economists bluntly concluded: "Economists persist in traditional neoclassical welfare analysis for one very basic reason. It is an elaborate
56
apology for the [economic] status quo."
B.

The Assumption That Efficiency Is Taste Neutral
In addition to the implicit assumption that efficiency is a
distributionally neutral standard, there is another troublesome assumption: that it is taste neutral. This is commonly phrased as a belief that preferences are not determined by the market-an "immaculate conception" theory of tastes in Kenneth Boulding's phrase. 57 This
is a questionable position since the genetic component in tastes is relatively small. Beyond such basic needs as food and shelter, tastes are
acquired; even the method of satisfying the limited basic needs has a
substantial learned component. In the long run "people's tastes are
.. . too much influenced by what is being produced and consumed,
and by what has been produced and consumed in the past, to make
the assumptions that they are independent anything but a hollow pre58
tence.In addition to existing and historical production and consumption, the existing entitlements play a large role in determining preferences. Liability rules, for example, inevitably affect taste. Similarly,
"'achange in the general system of property must affect the way people behave." 59 Thus, once again, Williams' implicit adoption of the
existing entitlement structure precludes him from making a nonnormative comparison of alternative entitlements.
55. Baker, supra note 43, at 476.
56. d'Arge & Hunt, Economic Orthodoxy and ExternalitiesRevisited, 1 ENVT'L AFF.
845, 851 (1972).
57.

K. BOULDING, ECONOMICS AS A SCIENCE 118 (1970).

58. I.M.D. LITTLE, supra note 43, at 50. Producers now largely determine what will
be produced rather than consumers making this determination through the market.
Galbraith, Economics as a System of Belief, 60 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proc.) 469
(1970). As a result, the assumption that individuals are the best judges of their own welfare becomes a dubious starting point, and "the foundation necessary to enable economists to infer and measure increases in individual or social welfare crumbles up In
these circumstances." E. MISHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 112 (1967).

59.

Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 49, at 1139.

1980]

SOLAR ACCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Williams' acceptance of the status quo is an informatively static
position: political action is taboo. 60 He supports this restrictive position by arguing that "property rights should be settled and free from
tinkering" to "afford the owner personal psychological security and a
measure of independence."'6 1 A strict application of this principle
would render the law incapable of responding to changing conditions
since most legal changes have some impact on existing property
entitlements. Entitlements, however, do change. And in fact, the
recognition of a "new" entitlement may result from the same desire
to provide the psychological security and measured independence
62
that Williams invokes to support his stationary vision.
This argument is merely a facet of Williams' refusal to confront
the distributional issues implicit in any entitlement system. c3 It is a
particularly weak justification when the issue is what the entitlement
structure should be. It is further weakened when offered as a
counterargument to the conclusion that the social situation has
changed and that the law should be modified to reflect the new
reality-the thrust of the articles that Williams dismisses as
"skewed." When the central issue is what type of society we want to
become, fundamental democratic propositions argue for a determination in an arena where the outcome will be the result of "one person,
one vote" rather than of the efficiency standard of "one dollar, one
vote"-particularly when dollar votes can be bought with advertising.
Williams' acceptance of the existing entitlement structure effectively precludes him from using his property rights analysis to reach
meaningful conclusions about either the value of alternative entitlements or the more fundamental question of proper social goals. Since
the existing entitlements have a major effect on individual preferences and on the resulting "efficient" resource allocation, neither
market preferences nor efficiency provides the required objective leverage point.
60.

This position is manifest in his attack on the presumptions of the existing litera-

ture on access. He criticizes the authors for their skewed vision in concluding that "it Is
conceptually and constitutionally possible" to remove the barriers to solar energy
through political means. Williams, supra note 1, at 431.
61. Id. at 458 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This argument, however, can be

severely twisted. Cf. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J.) (overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)) ("It is sur-

prising, to say the least, to find (this] nearly unanimous recent [decision] swept away in
the name of stare decisis." 429 U.S. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
62. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73
YA.E L.J. 733 (1964).

63. See generally Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes,
14 J.L. & ECON. 435 (1971).
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WHAT Is, Is VERY NEARLY THE BEST

With these biases implicit in his analytic framework, it is hardly
surprising that Williams concludes that what is, is very nearly the
best. The "what is," is easements and restrictive covenants; the "very
nearly" is to be remedied by legislative action thereby producing the
best of all possible results. While he does not specify precisely what
legislative action is suitable, he seems to favor some form of subsidization of solar energy so that it can compete in the market with the
64
already heavily subsidized conventional fuels.

Williams is more explicit about the other half of the couplet in
his assertion that "a restructuring of current property concepts presents serious difficulties."65 In reaching this conclusion, Williams
applies his property rights analysis to the law of nuisance, spite
fences, prior appropriation, prescription, and zoning. Only two of his
proposed solutions, nuisance and prior appropriation, will be examined. Since the arguments supporting these approaches have been
presented elsewhere, 66 they will not be reviewed here.
A.

Nuisance Law
Williams advances four main arguments against the extension of
common law nuisance concepts to situations involving a deprivation of
solar access. The first focuses on a perceived factual distinction. In
the ordinary nuisance action, offensive emissions often affect a substantial number of landowners. 67 Solar access situations, on the other
hand, generally involve only two parties. The large number of affected parties in traditional nuisance situations increases transaction
costs, creates potential holdout problems, 68 and thereby precludes
the parties from reaching a voluntary agreement. A court, however,
is able to cut through these problems and produce the efficient solution that transaction costs prevented the market from achieving. 69

64. Williams does cite with approval the recent enactment of federal tax incentives.
Williams, supra note 1, at 457 n.66.
65. Id. at 457.
66. See generally Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65
CALIF. L. REV. 94 (1977); Comment, Securing Solar Rights: Easements, Nuisance, or
Zoning?, 3 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 112 (1976); Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing a
Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REV. 94 (1977); Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar
Rights and the PriorAppropriation Doctrine, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 421 (1976).
67. Williams, supra note 1, at 441.
68. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
69. The example Williams provides demonstrates several interesting points on the
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Since access cases do not present similar transaction cost problems,

Williams argues that courts reasonably might conclude that their refusal to recognize a common law right to solar access on a nuisance
theory will be remedied by the market in "a large fraction of the in70
stances" where access is efficient.

The argument thus is inextricably tied to Williams' conclusions
that access will require only two-party negotiations that will have relatively low transaction costs. Given the apparent solar motion, how-

ever, it is far from clear that most transactions will involve only two
landowners. 7 ' Even if only two parties are involved, their relative
bargaining positions are strikingly unequal. 72 Transaction costs are

also likely to remain high in any event because of novelty, inertia,
and drafting complexities. 73 Thus, even if the number of people inapplication of property rights economics to legal issues. First, in his hypothetical, ten

landowners each suffer $1,500 in losses due to the pollution. The emissions could be
eliminated for $10,000. Williams concludes, therefore, that "the situation contains the
potential for a bargain." Williams, supra note 1, at 441. That is, the landowners could
pay the polluter between $10,000 and $15,000 to stop polluting! While the court might
enjoin the polluter, require him to pay damages, or both, it would not require the landowners to pay-but then, wealth transfers are not important to property rights analysts.
Second, Williams has implicitly adopted the approach of Posner's Economic Analysis
of Law: Judges are trying to do what is "efficient." See R. PosNER, supra note 24. For
example, Williams notes that nuisance law creates difficulties because courts seek "to
achieve utilitarian outcomes by imposing a value-maximizing [i.e., efficient] outcome on
disputing parties." Williams, supra note 1, at 444 n.38. Proponents of this position find
support for their hypothesis by demonstrating that the results are generally efficient.
Such demonstrations, however, have reversed the cause-and-effect linkage. The court in
Williams' hypothetical, for example, is determining a distribution of entitlements either
to pollute or to be free from pollution. Since the distribution largely determines efficiency, declaring the results of an entitlement distribution to be efficient is not very enlightening. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Samuels, supra note 50, at
9 ("Given the structure of rights there will be or tend to be an optimal solution specific
thereto. Change the structure of rights and there will be or tend to be a changed solution.").
Third, ironically both property rights analysts and their radical critics are arguing that
courts do the same thing-only their terminology differs. Property rights analysts speak
ofjudges being "efficient"; radicals speak of them as reinforcing the "class structure" of
the existing social system. To the extent that both terms are reducible to the system of
property entitlements, however, they are synonymous.
Finally, Williams assumes that the status quo ante entitlement is one to pollute. This
presumption is also common in the economic analysis of law. It seems that "economics"
and "ecology" have only etymology in common. See generally note 22 supra and accompanying text.
70. Williams, supra note 1, at 441.
71. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 36 supra.
73. See notes 33 & 34, 37 supra and accompanying text.
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volved differs, both nuisance actions and solar access share a common
economic problem: transaction costs are likely to preclude many bargains. Furthermore, even accepting Williams' conclusions on relative
transaction costs does not necessitate accepting his conclusion on the
impropriety of extending nuisance law. As he acknowledges, in situations where transaction costs are low, "most of the problems associated with importing nuisance . .

.

concepts to solar access issues

would not be present." 74 But it is only in low-transaction-cost situations that the market is not biased against solar access.75
Williams' second argument is that the present lack of a nuisance
action to protect solar access may be traceable to "a rough judicial assessment of the comparative values at stake." 76 Since "value" reflects
the existing entitlement structure, 77 however, it is of limited utility in
answering questions of whether that structure should be modified. In
addition, Williams recognizes that such historical value comparisons
must be qualified by "modem increases in the relative value of solar
energy.'78

The third argument that Williams advances is that the recognition of a new cause of action, and the entitlement that it would imply, would involve an additional cost resulting from "the consequences
of erroneous judgments. ""His argument on this point is revealing.
He compares his ideal market, where only "occasional lunacies" lead
to incorrect valuations of access,80 to real-world judges who unfortunately cannot "costlessly acquire perfect knowledge." 81 Even laying
aside such technical limitations, Williams' argument is unpersuasive.
There does not appear to be any intrinsic reason why courts would
have greater problems assigning a value to access rights than to any
other property interest. Furthermore, even the market produces a
certain degree of error since some efficient access agreements will not
74. Williams, supra note 1, at 457 n.65.

75. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
76.

Williams, supra note 1, at 442. Cf. Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232, 243 (Supp.

1860) ("The consequence of an admission of the right [to acquire easements of light by
prescription] would be, that the occupants of low and inferior houses ... would acquire
rights ... which might render useless and waste the most valuable lots for business purposes or residences ....
").The judge in Klein was obviously unfamiliar with the Implications of the Coase Theorem.
77. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
78. Williams, supra note 1, at 443.
79. Id. at 444.
80. Id. at 437.
81.

Id. at 444.
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be made because of transaction costs. 8 2 A decision to reverse the

market bias thus does not seem assailable unless it can be demonstrated that errors would be far more frequent and damaging.
Williams does not offer such evidence.
Williams also argues that the recognition of a new nuisance action would increase both governmental and private litigation costs:
"This paucity of cases is so quiet a virtue that it may be overlooked.
Yet the vice which all of the proposed changes would entail is significant litigation over whether a solar user has some legal right . . .
and over the scope of the right."83 Although his argument has some
merit, it has two primary weaknesses. First, it ignores the costs of
the present no-entitlement situation. There are, for example, a number of social costs, such as pollution, that would be reduced by increased reliance on solar energy. The market does not account for
such costs because of their unfocused impact. Second, the paucity of
cases may be the result of the current historical situation rather than
a lack of litigious owners of solar energy systems. The number of systems is relatively small; most have been in place for a very short period and it is therefore unlikely that vegetation would have grown or
new construction started. There is evidence to support this reasoning
in the fact that solar access cases are now being filed.84 Thus,
Williams' conclusion may be premature.
Finally, many of Williams' arguments would be circumvented or
severely restricted by the enactment of a statute declaring the shading of solar collectors to be a public nuisance. 85 The statute, by limit82. Id. at 437.

83. Id. at 453. See also id. at 444.
84. A suit was recently brought in Hawaii, for example, to enjoin the construction of
a high-rise building that obstructed sunlight flowing to a solar collector. The court "regrettably" denied the injunction, commenting that government encouragement of solar
energy "doesn't do much good... without access to the sun." Siu v. McCully-Citron
Co., Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Nov. 4, 1978, § A, at 9, col. 4 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. Nov. 3,
1978). See also G. HAYES, SOLAR ACCESS LAw 9 (1979); 1 SOLAR L. REP. 245 (1979); 1
SOLAR L. REP. 542 (1979).

85. California has enacted such a statute. It specifies that the shading of more than
"10 percent of the collector absorption area" of a collector located in compliance with
the statute is a public nuisance. It also provides enforcement procedures and certain exemptions and exceptions. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 25980-25986 (West Supp. 1979). In
his discussion of zoning, Williams cites this statute as an example of a "device that suffers from insufficient attention to relevant variables." Williams, supra note 1, at 455
n.61. His concern is that the statute is not sufficiently flexible. For example, it "makes
no allowance . . . for the loss inflicted on the person proposing new construction that
would shade the solar device." Id. First, the statute applies only to vegetation; construction is not prohibited. Second, since the statute does not preclude subsequent transfers
between the solar owner and the potential obstructor, his argument is, within the frame-
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ing the number of factors to be considered, would obviate many of
the difficulties of balancing the value of solar access against the value
of obstruction. It would also reduce erroneous judgments because it
would be a legislative determination that access was the more important value. Finally, a statutory approach would result in reduced litigation expenses since the right to access and its scope would be
specified. In effect, the statute would merely restructure the existing
entitlements, thus altering the theoretically efficient allocation. To
the extent that Williams' general analysis is correct, therefore, the
market will be unimpaired.
B.

PriorAppropriation

Williams' analysis of the prior appropriation doctrine is even
more problematic. A significant amount of the difficulties stems from
his literalness. Despite his recognition that the appropriation doctrine
has been cited only as a useful analogy, he argues that it is difficult,
for example, to imagine a diversion of sunlight.8 6 An analogy, however, requires only similarity, not identity.87
Williams' difficulties are further compounded by his reluctance
to look beyond the common-law features of the doctrine. While the
common law remains the basis for western water law, significant and
readily applicable modifications were made when most western states
shifted to a statutory permit system early in this century. The modwork of his own market analysis, nonsensical-but revealing. The statute merely shifts
transaction costs. Any new construction should still be able to proceed if it is efficient.
86. Williams, supra note 1, at 448-49.
87. Unfortunately, this literal-mindedness is shared by several commentators. See,
e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL BARRIERS TO SOLAR HEATING AND
COOLING OF BUILDINGS 27 (1977); S. KRAEMER, supra note 34, at 151. The degree of

identity that Williams seems to require would, for example, render the concept of "precedent" largely meaningless. Edward Levi has summarized the problem confronting legal logic:
The problem for the law is: When will it be just to treat different cases as
though they were the same? A working legal system must therefore be willing
to pick out key similarities and to reason from them to the justice of applying a
common classification....
But this kind of reasoning is open to the charge that it is classifying things as
equal when they are somewhat different .... In a sense all reasoning is of this
type, but there is an additional requirement which compels the legal process to
be this way. Not only do new situations arise, but in addition peoples' wants
change.
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3-4 (paperbound ed. 1949) (footnote

omitted).
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er permit systems offer the most comprehensive model for devel88
oping solar access rights.
Williams presents three arguments against adapting the appropriation doctrine. The first is a perceived definitional problem. Largely

because of the historical context in which it developed, the appropriation doctrine initially focused on the physical diversion of water from

a stream as the crucial factor. Its role, however, was largely evidentiary. In the absence of local governments, diversion was proof of an
intent to appropriate. 8 9 While courts continue to speak of diversion,

the doctrine has been legislatively modified.9 0 Applying the evidentiary purpose of the diversion requirement to solar energy should

present few difficulties: the person applies for a permit and installs
the collector.91

The second and third arguments, that the doctrine would encourage premature development and that it would result in wasteful
uses, both involve a misunderstanding of the central concept of the
prior appropriation doctrine--"beneficial use." The fundamental na-

ture of the concept is captured in the frequently iterated maxim that
88. Probably the most modem and well-reasoned system is one recently adopted by
Alaska. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.030-.130 (1979). For an access permit system modeled on the appropriation system, see Goble, Solar Access: Evaluation of Present Statutes and Proposed Legislation, in Proceedings of Solar 79 Northwest 172 (Aug. 10-12,
1979).
89.
To constitute an appropriation, therefore, there must co-exist "the intent to
take, accompanied by some open, physical demonstration of the intent, and for
some valuable use." McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River and Auburn Water
and Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220, 232-33 (1859). The outward manifestation is most
often evidenced by a diversion of the water from its natural source prior to the
use; ... but it can also be evidenced in other ways, for example, as in this case,
by watering livestock directly from the source . . . or as in other cases by
placing water wheels into a stream in order to use the flowage as power to operate a mill located on the bank.
Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 153 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Genoa v. Westiall,
141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
90. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) to (4) (1973) (manmade diversion requirement of common law no longer required for a finding of appropriation or prior appropriation); OR. REV. STAT. § 536.410 (1979) (appropriation defined merely as beneficial use).
91. Williams thus misses the point in concluding that the diversion "requirements"
would force the court to "become embroiled in case-by-case determination of comparative values." Williams, supra note 1, at 449. Even if one assumes that Williams is correct in concluding that courts would have difficult' in defining what constitutes an appropriation of solar access, the issue would be one of formulating and applying a
definition, not one of comparing values.
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beneficial use is the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right to
use water. 92 That is, water can be appropriated only for a beneficial
use; 93 no right to water in excess of the amount that can be beneficially used is valid;94 and if water is no longer being beneficially
used, the right is lost. 95
Williams' argument that adopting an appropriation permit system
will lead to premature development that cannot be "economically
justified apart from enabling [the developer] to secure additional
property rights," 96 ignores the beneficial use limitation. Unless the
use is beneficial, no right accrues. 97 The argument also ignores the
fundamcntal distinction between siting a collector and assuring access
to it.98 Thus while his argument might be telling against certain siting
rules, it has only minimal impact on the problem of assuring a properly sited collector with solar access.
As Williams acknowledges, his argument that an appropriation
permit system would promote wasteful uses is a weak one since the
market would cure any waste. Whatever the waste problems may be
in water law, "the appropriation doctrine may pose less of a problem
for solar access than for water.'99
92.

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973). See also 1 W. HUTCHINS,

438-42 (1971).
93. "The concept that use of... water must be made for beneficial purposes is fundamental in western water jurisprudence." 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 92, at 438. See
also In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, 202 P.2d 535 (1949); Dalton v. Kelsey, 58 Or. 244, 114
P. 464 (1911).
94. "An excessive diversion of water for any purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion for a beneficial use. In so far as the diversion exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for beneficial purposes, it is contrary to the policy of the law ... and confers no
title, no matter for how long continued." Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore
WATER RIGHTS LAW IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES

Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 547, 45 P.2d 972, 997 (1935). See also Ide v. United

States, 263 U.S. 497 (1924); Fourzan v. Curtis, 43 Ariz. 140, 29 P.2d 722 (1934); 1 W.
HUTCHINS, supra note 92, at 491-515.

95. "What is beneficial use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become
a waste of water at a later time." Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation
Dist., 3 Cal. 2d at 567, 45 P.2d at 1007. See also Conrow v. Huffine, 48 Mont. 437, 138
P. 1094 (1914); Crawford v. Lehi Irrigation Co., 10 Utah 2d 165, 350 P.2d 147 (1960).
96. Williams, supra note 1, at 449.
97. As one court noted: "[T]he rights acquired by the appropriator must be exercised
with reference to the general condition of the country and the necessities of the community and not for the purpose of obtaining a monopoly of water .
Hewitt v. Story, 64
F. 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1894).
98. The failure to recognize this distinction has plagued the legal discourse on the
access issue. The two issues have been treated as synonymous. But see Goble, A Note
on Solar Access, 2 SOLAR L. REP.

-

123.
99. Williams, supra note 1, at 451.

(1980). See also S. KRAEMER, supra note 34, at

1980]

SOLAR ACCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Thus, at least for nuisance law and the prior appropriation doctrine, it appears unlikely that an alteration of the entitlement structure would produce serious difficulties. As Williams notes, the problems that he foresees would not be present when transaction costs are
low.100 But only when transaction costs are zero is the market unbiased against solar energy. A change in the entitlement structure can,
therefore, be expected to increase the number of solar energy systems by shifting the burden of transaction costs.
CONCLUSION

It is characteristic of the age in which we live to think too
much in terms of economics, to see things too predominantly in their economic aspect; and this is especially true of
the American people. There is no more important prerequisite to clear thinking in regard to economics itself than is
recognition of its limited place among human interests at
10
large. '
Williams sets out to correct the "skewed vision" that he believes
pervades the legal literature on assuring access to sunlight. Unlike
the challenged vision, he makes no explicit appeal for a political resolution of the problem. Instead, his arguments concern more mundane
matters. Williams merely applies a property rights analysis to the issue and reaches an apparently objective conclusion: A change in the
property rights structure to facilitate solar access will reduce efficiency and lead to a misallocation of other valuable resources.
The air of objectivity is, however, unwarranted. It serves to obscure the shaky ethical and factual foundations on which his argument
is erected. Before his conclusions can be accepted it is necessary to
make at least three Kierkegaardian leaps of faith.
First, the blatantly ethical vision of the world inherent in welfare
economics must be accepted. It is a world without love or envy, peopled by rational, atomistic homo oeconoinicus. As one economist protested, if the viewpoint of welfare economics "had to compete in the
marketplace for ethical ideas it could not.., long survive. "102
100. Id. at 457 n.65. it should be remembered that Williams argues that this is the
overwhelming majority of instances.
101. F. KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 3 (1951).
102. Alexander, Human Values and Economists' Values, in HUMAN VALUES AND

PoLIcY 101, 108 (S. Hook ed. 1967). This belief has been echoed in less
emotional tones by most theoretical welfare economists. See, e.g., J. DE V. CRAAFF, SUpra note 13, at 1 ("Theoretical welfare economics proceeds from a number of definite
assumptions, factual and ethical, which are seldom stated explicitly. If their nature were
ECONOMIC
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Second, it is necessary to believe that the present distribution of
wealth, entitlements, and income are-if not the best possible-at
least the best attainable. Since rights specify efficiency (rather than
efficiency specifying rights), Williams' goal of using efficiency to evaluate alternative entitlements is chimerical.
Finally, it is necessary to affirm the existence of a miraculous
allocative machine-the perfect market-that even its most fervent
proponents do not pretend actually exists. Until omniscience is a human birthright, it cannot exist. Perhaps with Tertullian it is best to
simply proclaim: "[I]t must be believed, because it is absurd."10 3
Welfare economics and its property rights progeny thus are far
closer to a branch of theology than to a branch of physics. The danger, however, is that the apparently value-free jargon of the laissezfaire priests will obscure this.
This is not to say that economics has no role in human affairs or
that it has nothing to offer to the energy debate. Economists are eminently qualified to offer evidence on the employment impact or capital requirements of alternatives, for example. But on the teleological
question-what is the most socially desirable energy policy-they
have precious little to offer.
The Harvard Business School-hardly a bastion of anticapitalist
loonies-recently challenged the belief that the market should be left
to supply the amount and types of energy that society wants. In language that applies equally to solar energy, the report argued:
[An] obstacle to productive conservation may be summarized by the maxim, Let the market do its work. Proponents of this view say that the present levels of conservation
activity are a rational response to present energy prices. In
other words, price will determine the extent of conservation
...
. But that is not enough. Even if prices did begin to
rise substantially tomorrow, conservation would still be seriously hampered by political and social barriers. .

.

. Exces-

sive faith in the market tends to obscure the difficulties and
requirements of the needed transition away from the world
of imported oil. 10 4

more widely appreciated ... it is improbable that the conventional conclusions of welfare theory would continue to be stated with as little caution as is at present the custom.").
103. TERTULLIAN, DE CARNE CHmSTI 5, quoted in Pagels, The Threat of the Gnostics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 8, 1979, at 37, 37.
104. Yergin, Conservation: The Key Energy Source, in ENERGY FUTURE 136, 141
(1979) (footnote omitted).

